Bay Area Employment Lawyer Blog

Retaliation Claim Survives Even When Underlying Sexual Harassment Claim Fails

Published on: December 31, 2013 | Siegel LeWitter Malkani

Sometimes courts raise the bar on sexual harassment claims too high. Whether the sexual harasser’s conduct is “severe” or “pervasive” enough to go to trial often seems to be determined by the subjective lenses of the judges. The judges’ lenses are often colored by their own life experience. Certainly whether a judge is a “he” or “she” may impact the analysis. Although here in Westendorf v. West Coast Contractors of Nevada, Inc. 712 F.3d 417 (9th Cir 2013), the three judge panel, including a female judge, all found against Ms. Westendorf’s sexual harassment claim. Judges ought to walk a mile in the shoes of the victims of this offensive conduct, and they might not be so quick to declare that the conduct isn’t severe or pervasive enough. I guess the judges weren’t as offended as I was by all the talk about breasts and orgasms.

However, the same panel of judges did understand that Ms. Westendorf’s claim for retaliatory termination should go forward, holding that there was a material fact as to whether she was fired because she complained of the crude and offensive remarks.

So, for Ms. Westendorf, the glass is half empty or half full, depending on the perspective!!

Be Careful What You Say In Your Disability Application: It May Not Bar Your Case, But You’ll Have Some Explaining to Do

Published on: December 23, 2013 | Siegel LeWitter Malkani

The best that can be said about Smith v. Clark County School District (9th Cir 2013) 727 F.3d 950, as well as all the case law examining whether what an employee said on his or her disability application bars a claim for disability discrimination/failure to accommodate, is: BE CAREFUL! Anything you say can and will be used against you. However, as explained by the Ninth Circuit in Smith , if what you say can be interpreted in more than one way, this is a question for the jury.

Ms. Smith worked as a literacy specialist at a school district. She had a back injury that limited her mobility. When her principal informed her that she was being assigned to teach kindergarten for the next academic year, she told the principal that her back injury prevented her from doing so. Thereinafter, Ms. Smith aggravated her back injury, and was off work totally until the end of the academic year. She applied for disability benefits and family leave.

Ms. Smith filed a claim for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The employer-school district filed for summary judgment.

Labor Arbitration May Preclude Common Law Claims Such as Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Published on: December 17, 2013 | Siegel LeWitter Malkani

The law is pretty well settled that a labor arbitration does not generally bar a unionized employee from bringing a claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, such as a discrimination, sexual harassment or retaliation claim. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver (1974) 415 U.S. 36; Camargo v. California Portland Cement Co. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 995. However, Wade v. Ports America Management Corporation (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 648 declined to extend this good fortune to non-statutory claims such as wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

Mr. Wade brought a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. His public policy claim was for race discrimination. Wade justified this outcome by noting the uniqueness of the Fair Employment and Housing Act’s statutory scheme. That part, I generally understand, even if I don’t agree with it However, the Court didn’t stop there. It came up with a hard-to-follow and not so well- reasoned argument that Mr. Wade’s public policy against race discrimination was violated was encompassed in his union arbitrations and therefore precluded by it. The fact that his union arbitration didn’t in any way address race discrimination, didn’t stop the Court from its labored and illogical analysis that it did. So, be very careful of your labor arbitration’s impact on any civil case you might bring!

Jody I. LeWitter

Enforceability of Wage Claim Arbitrations Hangs in the Lurch Pending Remand in California Supreme Court’s Sonic II

Published on: November 20, 2013 | Siegel LeWitter Malkani

The tension between an employee’s simple right to receive his wages for work he performed and the U.S. Supreme Court’s favoritism towards employers, is almost palpable in the tortured history of Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (Sonic II) ___ Ca.4th ___ (Oct. 17, 2013).

Here the employer imposed an arbitration agreement upon Mr. Moreno. When Mr. Moreno filed a simple Labor Commission claim to collect his vacation pay, the employer refused to attend the Labor Commission (Berman) hearing, and instead moved to arbitrate the claim. I suspect the move was a ploy to make it so expensive and time consuming for poor Mr. Moreno to collect what wasn’t a large amount of money to begin with, that he’d just give up. Lucky for Mr. Moreno, the Labor Commissioner realized the negative implications for all employees just trying to get paid for the work they do, if they can’t go to the Labor Commission.

In 2011 the California Supreme Court held that Mr. Moreno was entitled to his Labor Commission hearing, and that if the employer was dissatisfied with the results of the Berman hearing, it could then move to arbitrate. This was a fairly benign and logical holding.

Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Continues to Flutter in the Wind: Arbitration Agreement Upheld in Peng v. First Republic, but Depending on Circumstances, Might Not be Upheld in Other Cases

Published on: November 13, 2013 | Siegel LeWitter Malkani

Reading arbitration cases is like walking through a muddy field on a dark and rainy night. What is okay in the context of one case, is not in the context of another case. It just depends on how much you slip and slide through the mud and where exactly you fall.

Take the recent case of Peng v. First Republic (2013) 219 Ca.4th 1462. The Court held that failure to attach the arbitration rules didn’t make the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable. On the other hand, if the arbitration rules had changed any important substantive rights, the agreement might have been procedurally unconscionable. So, we are left guessing whether in any other situation, an employer has to provide the arbitration rules to an employee or not.

Second, Peng held that the right of the employer to change the employment contract terms at any time, whereas the employee cannot, did not make this agreement substantively unconscionable. Why? Because the employer is supposed to act with “good faith . . . and fair dealing.” So, if the employer doesn’t act in good faith and fair dealing, well, then, is the agreement invalid? Again, slip and slide. We’re left guessing.

California Court of Appeals Clarifies That the Standard for Discrimination Claims is Generally Now a Substantial Motivating Factor After Harris v. Santa Monica

Published on: November 1, 2013 | Siegel LeWitter Malkani

Proving discrimination cases by the standard of a “substantial motivating factor” is now clearly the law of the land – at least in the land of California. Let’s look at why this is so, and what it means.

First, in May 2013, the California Supreme Court declared that the standard of “substantial motivating factor” would replace the previously accepted “a motivating factor” in mixed motive cases under California law. Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal.4th 203 (2013). (Mixed motive cases are cases where the employee proves there was discrimination, but the employer proves it would have made the same decision even without this discriminatory animus).

Although the language in Harris was broadly stated, it wasn’t one hundred percent clear whether this standard applied to all discrimination cases under California law, or just mixed motive cases. Along comes Alamo v. Practice Management Information Corporation (2013) 219 Cal.4th 466, holding that the Harris decision applies to almost all employment discrimination cases, thus hammering a nail in the coffin of “a motivating factor” standard under California law. In other words, in an employment discrimination case, although discrimination need not be the sole reason for the wrongful act – it must be a “substantial motivating factor”.

California Employees Can Avoid the Supreme Court’s New Heightened Burden in Retaliation Cases

Published on: July 26, 2013 | Siegel LeWitter Malkani

Dr. Naiel Nassar was employed by the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center as a faculty member and staff physician. Dr. Nassar, who is of Middle Eastern descent and practices Islam, claimed that one of his supervisors was biased against him on account of his ethnic heritage and religion. As a result, he resigned his faculty position, but continued working as a staff physician.

After resigning, he sent a letter complaining that the reason he resigned was due to his supervisor’s “religious, racial and cultural bias against Arabs and Muslims.” Based on this complaint, the Hospital withdrew his job offer. Dr. Nassar filed a Title VII lawsuit claiming, among other things, retaliation. The jury found for Dr. Nassar and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the retaliation verdict. (The jury also found for Dr. Nassar on his discrimination/constructive termination claim. The Court of Appeals reversed on that issue. That claim was not before the Supreme Court). However, the University appealed to the Supreme Court to decide what type of causation a plaintiff must prove in a retaliation case.

In Title VII discrimination cases, a plaintiff only needs to show that his discrimination was a “motivating factor” in the decision to terminate him. The “motivating factor” standard acknowledges that even though there may be legitimate factors in deciding to take an adverse employment action against an employee, if the employee shows that discriminatory animus was one of the motivating factors, he has met his burden.

New U.S. Supreme Court Cases on Same-Sex Marriage Expand Leave Rights for Same-Sex Spouses

Published on: July 19, 2013 | Siegel LeWitter Malkani

On June 24, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued two rulings that were met with a roar of approval from equal rights advocates from coast to coast. Just days before the annual LGBT pride celebrations got underway nationwide, the Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), and issued another decision which resulted in same-sex marriages resuming in the state of California.

Although the most obvious effect of Hollingsworth v. Perry is that same-sex couples once again have the right to get married in California, many same-sex couples are now wondering how their rights, if they choose to get married, will be impacted with respect to their employment. One of the many benefits same-sex spouses are now entitled to is family leave under the federal Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).

In U.S. v. Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of DOMA that defined the term “spouse” as only a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife, and defined “marriage” as a legal union between a man and a woman. There are over 1,000 federal statutes that use the term “spouse,” and among them is the FMLA which provides up to twelve weeks per year of job-protected unpaid leave for covered employees. Prior to the U.S. v. Windsor decision, same-sex spouses could not take FMLA leave to care for each other because they were excluded from coverage by the opposite-sex definition of spouse in DOMA. Now, however, same-sex spouses are entitled to coverage under the FMLA and may take leave to care for their spouse with a serious health condition. Unfortunately, however, this decision does not have an impact on couples in recognized domestic partnerships or civil unions which means, same-sex couples who are not married are still without FMLA rights.

Lucky to be a California Employee: If you are Harassed by a Supervisor You Can Avoid the US Supreme Court’s Ruling in Vance v. Ball State University

Published on: July 9, 2013 | Siegel LeWitter Malkani

Under both California law and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, your employer may be liable if you are harassed by either a co-worker or a supervisor. However, it is more difficult to hold an employer liable for harassment if the harasser is a co-worker, and easier if the harasser is a “supervisor.” Enter the United States Supreme Court in Vance v. Ball State University, unnecessarily tightening up who is a supervisor to allow employers to escape responsibility for harassment.

Title VII does not specifically define who is a “supervisor,” which has created some disagreement among the lower courts. Some courts determined that an employee is not a supervisor unless he or she has the power to “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline the victim,” while other courts follow the broader interpretation of supervisor which includes individuals who have “the ability to exercise significant discretion over [another employee’s] daily work.” While the difference may seem subtle, it is common in many workplaces for an employee to have a supervisor who tells them what to do on a daily basis but that person does not have the authority to hire, fire, or promote them.

This difference is particularly important for workers like Ms. Maetta Vance. Ms. Vance, an African American woman, worked as a catering assistant at Ball State University. She complained on several occasions that catering specialist, Saundra Davis, racially harassed her over a period of time. She also alleged that Ms. Davis was her supervisor, and therefore, the University was liable for the harassment.

Court of Appeal Determines that Blowing the Whistle on Unlawful Activity of Other Employees is Protected

Published on: June 26, 2013 | Siegel LeWitter Malkani

Most of us in California are familiar with California Redemption Value, or CRV, that we pay when we purchase a beverage from a retailer. If you take your empty bottles and cans to a recycling center, you can get a CRV refund, which is normally determined by the weight of the recyclables you bring in. Although one or two cans does not add up to much, Recology employee Brian McVeigh uncovered substantial fraud with respect to these refunds and was fired after reporting his suspicions.

Brian McVeigh worked as an operations supervisor at Pier 96 for Recology San Francisco, the company that provides waste recycling and disposal in the County of San Francisco. During his employment, Mr. McVeigh discovered that employees were engaging in “tag inflation” meaning that the Recology attendants were weighing customers’ recyclables but inflating the weight on the tag. As a result, customers received inflated payments from the California Department of Conservation and attendants were potentially receiving kickbacks from this practice. He reported the fraud to both Recology and the San Francisco police.

Later, Mr. McVeigh was transferred to the company’s buy-back center in Brisbane. Mr. McVeigh began suspecting tag inflation and a management cover up at the Brisbane location and reported his suspicions to local police. After finding out about his reports, Recology threatened Mr. McVeigh by telling him that he would be fired if he continued to pursue the CRV fraud, which he reported to HR. Thereafter, Mr. McVeigh was terminated and Mr. McVeigh sued under a number of legal theories.